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Social Behavior: From Cooperation to Language
Social behavior is an integral part of complex life. According
to Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry (1997), it encompasses the
last two major transitions in the evolution of life: the transition
from solitary to social organisms, giving rise to the formation
of social groups, and the transition from primate societies to
human societies, enabling the emergence of language. The
pivotal role of social behavior is especially apparent from the
wide scope it spans over many natural phenomena, ranging
from signaling in bacteria to altruism in social insects and
to human cooperation, which has led to modern society as we
know it. The articles in this thematic issue ofBiological Theory
on social behavior provide an interdisciplinary view, reaching
across the full spectrum of its complexity, while nevertheless
following a common thread.
Given its central role, it is hardly surprising that research
on social behavior has given rise to a vast ﬁeld, scattered
across disciplines, and comprising a range of different research
methods and model organisms. Traditionally, understanding
the emergence and organization of social behavior has been
tackled separately for humans and other living organisms, sep-
arately by biologists and social scientists, and separately by
researchers using models and those conducting ﬁeld studies.
In many cases, there has been relatively little communication
between these camps, making it difﬁcult to see the forest for
the trees.
More recently, however, there has been a general trend
toward a more integrative approach to understanding social
behavior (Laland et al. 2000; Caporael 2001; Hammerstein
2003), of which the articles in this issue are representative.
The selection of articles presented here shows that common
denominators of social behavior can be found despite varia-
tions in discipline, approach, and species studied. In this edito-
rial we will brieﬂy outline the traditional divisions in the study
of social behavior, highlight emerging parallels, and discuss
how the articles in this thematic issue may be indicative of a
movement toward a common view on social behavior.
The ﬁrst traditional divide to be conquered is between
the exploration of sociality in human and nonhuman animals.
Much of the work on social behavior in nonhuman animals
has focused on explaining the cooperative nature of social
behavior. Due to its central role in the evolution of complex
life, the evolution and stability of cooperative behavior has
been described as one of the deﬁning questions of modern
biology (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003). Cooperative behavior
has been studied in aggregations of slime molds, schooling
in ﬁsh, dominance hierarchies of chickens, and parental care
in primates, among many other examples (Wilson 1975). The
champions of sociality, however, are clearly the social insects,
which is why much work in understanding nonhuman social
behavior has been carried out in that domain (Wilson 1975).
Social insect societies provide the most advanced exam-
ples of social organization known, paralleled in scale and com-
plexity only by human societies. As d’Ettorre points out in
this thematic issue, ants are a major model for studying the
evolution of cooperation and the transition from nonsocial to
social behavior, owing to their strikingly complex societies.
Ants comprise an exceptional diversity of social behaviors
found across the 12,000 classiﬁed species, which have col-
onized almost every landmass on Earth and compose about
15–20% of the animal biomass in most terrestrial environ-
ments (Ho¨lldobler and Wilson 1994). They also provide some
of the most remarkable examples of division of labor, with
many ant species forming castes of workers, soldiers, or other
specialized groups, and using highly speciﬁc chemical signals
for individual and broadcast communication (Wilson 1971;
Ho¨lldobler and Wilson 1994; Bourke and Franks 1995). Two
key features of the organization of these complex societies
are individual recognition and communication. In her contri-
bution, d’Ettorre reviews different levels of recognition and
their evolution from the comparably simple distinction be-
tween friend and foe to individual recognition and communi-
cation. The paper provides an overview of the basic circum-
stances that could have favored the emergence of these social
behaviors and reveals their chemical and neurological basis.
Apart from the social insects, it has often been remarked
that primates, and especially our own species, Homo sapiens,
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represent a pinnacle of sociality. It has been argued that hu-
man social systems are much more intricate than those of any
other animal because of the extreme degree of cooperative and
altruistic behavior found in humans (Wilson 1975; Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003;Warneken and Tomasello 2006), sometimes
referred to as prosocial behavior (Batson 1998). Human social
behavior is typically studied distinctly from sociality in other
animals within the ﬁelds of social psychology, economics,
political science, or anthropology. One reason may be the di-
versity and complexity of human prosocial behavior found
in modern societies, spanning examples from traditional fam-
ily businesses to multinational organizations, welfare states,
charities, or online projects like Wikipedia. However, while
the range of human social behaviors may be more impressive
than that of other social animals, some argue that the differ-
ence may be just quantitative rather than qualitative (Darwin
1859; Bekoff 2001).
One approach that attempts to address human and non-
human social behavior on a theoretical, abstract level beyond
species speciﬁcity is evolutionary game theory. Historically,
evolutionary game theory was conceived as a combination
of game theory, the discipline of strategic behavior in social
contexts, and evolutionary theory (Maynard Smith and Price
1973). It has since grown into a major tool for the study of
cooperation and has been used to address a large variety of
questions across disciplines (Hammerstein and Selten 1994).
In this issue, Hauert et al. present an evolutionary game
theoretical model that investigates the origins of cooperation
among unrelated individuals. Both punishment and voluntary
participation are mechanisms known to lead to cooperation in
public goods games (Hauert et al. 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher
2004). However, it is unclear how punishment can establish
itself in a population, and although voluntary participation
can lead to cooperation, it cannot guarantee a stable outcome.
Furthermore, evolutionary game theoretical models typically
use inﬁnite populations, an unrealistic assumption. In their
contribution to this issue, Hauert et al. give a detailed analysis
of the role of punishment and voluntary participation in
both ﬁnite and inﬁnite populations, showing that given ﬁnite
populations, voluntary participation can provide a path for the
establishment of punishment and cooperation.
The article by Hagen et al. in this issue gives an example
of parallels between nonhuman and human social behavior,
by highlighting similarities between animal communication
strategies and deliberate self-harm (DSH) in humans. Their
contribution draws on ﬁelds as far apart as economics, psy-
chology, and animal signaling, and postulates that the same
basic forces apply to both humans and nonhuman animals in
need of proving the honesty of messages they communicate.
They review the literature to support their hypothesis that DSH
can be seen as a costly signal to credibly communicate suffer-
ing to social partners. They point out that the idea that costly
signaling can be used as a guarantee for honesty represents
one of the main theories in animal signaling known as Za-
havi’s handicap principle (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997). Although
Zahavi’s theory was developed very soon after a very similar
theory in economics by Spence (1973), parallels between the
two ﬁelds are rarely drawn.
A characteristic that has been attributed to human social
behavior is that it is not only determined by genes, but also
by thoughts and ideas, which unlike genes easily ﬂow from
one person to another by imitation. This allows human social
behavior to be modiﬁed and adapted during an individual’s
lifetime, for example through individual learning or cultural
transmission (Tomasello 1999). We have now arrived at a sec-
ond junction, where the study of human social behavior has
traditionally been divided into research on cultural propagation
on the one hand, and biological evolution on the other.
The idea that parallels exist between cultural evolution
and evolution by natural selection goes back to Charles Darwin
(1871), whose theory of common descent seems to have been
inspired by John Herschel’s ideas on the common descent of
human languages (Whitﬁeld 2008). Thirty years ago, Richard
Dawkins (1976) made the parallels between both concepts
more tangible by developing the notion of “memes,” referring
to a unit of imitation, such as a song, skill, or religious belief.
Exploiting the parallels between cultural and genetic evolution
has since been repeatedly advocated as a means to advance our
understanding of both through collaboration between research
ﬁelds (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Blackmore 1999;
Laland et al. 2000; Hull 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003;
Hammerstein 2003;Whitﬁeld 2008). Nevertheless, there seem
to be relatively few studies in the literature that have put this
into practice (see Croft 2008 for a review).
The opening paper of this thematic issue by Caporael
presents a model of society that bridges the gap between genes
and culture by proposing repeated assemblies as an abstraction
that describes evolutionary processes (either in the genetic or
cultural sense). As an illustration of the concept, she uses the
framework of repeated assembly to organize human society
into overlapping social networks of different sizes that have
been established over human history through repeated face-to-
face interactions in coordinated groups. Her voice can thus be
added to those arguing for the establishment of more general
evolutionary models that bridge the gene–culture divide.
Perhaps some of the biggest controversies in the ﬁeld
are sparked by discussions on the origins of human language,
whether it is unique to humans and whether it originated as
a cultural or genetic phenomenon (Pinker and Bloom 1990;
Christiansen and Kirby 2003; Sza´mado´ and Szathma´ry 2006).
Language represents a universal human trait that has emerged
in all known human societies (Pinker and Bloom 1990; Hauser
1997), and has evolved into the almost 7000 known languages
in the world (Gordon 2005). Understanding the origins of
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human language has challenged researchers for centuries, but
has seen a recent revival with advances in the ﬁeld of neuro-
science; it has now grown into a large interdisciplinary ﬁeld of
study (Christiansen and Kirby 2003; Sza´mado´ and Szathma´ry
2006). The term language evolution usually refers to one of
two things: either the inquiry into the origins of language, or
the study of language change over time. Three articles in this
issue explore questions regarding the latter: Gong et al. show
how a spatial model can allow a vocabulary to self-organize
into one or more separate clusters of “languages” through
playing local naming and category games. Kandler and Steele
present an ecological model to analyze how competing lan-
guages behave in a population to determine the conditions
under which the dominated language would go extinct. In a
third article, Roberts reports on an empirical study with hu-
man subjects using an artiﬁcial language to test the hypothesis
that subtle cues in language use can communicate information
about the social group a speaker belongs to. Roberts’s article
discusses how cooperation and competition between individu-
als can shape their use of language, thereby highlighting a link
between cooperation and language that is rarely made.
Apart from such causal links, in this issue we also ﬁnd
parallels between cooperation and language in the processes
leading to their stabilization in populations of agents. Interest-
ingly, Pestelacci et al.’s contribution on the evolution of coop-
eration arrives at conclusions that are similar to those found in
the article by Gong et al. in this issue. By looking at cultural
evolution through imitation, Pestelacci et al. also ﬁnd that the
use of a spatial model applied to the prisoner’s dilemma and
stag hunt games can result in clustering effects that lead to the
convergence of multiple cooperative communities, as opposed
to the theoretical prediction of stable global defection in the
standard model.
Many of the articles in this issue follow a modeling ap-
proach, which brings us to yet another divide in the ﬁeld, con-
cerning the methods used to study social behavior. Scientiﬁc
methods can generally be broken down into empirical stud-
ies conducted directly on the actual system of interest (e.g.,
experiments with animals in the wild) and studies in which
reductionist models are built to represent some aspects of the
real system (e.g., statistical models, game-theoretical models,
or computer simulations) (Wartofsky 1979; Webb 2001). Bi-
ological Theory, as the name suggests, subscribes rather to
the latter approach, of which the articles in this thematic issue
are representative. A useful model reduces the real system of
interest to its key parameters, such that its mechanisms are
simple enough to understand, yet generates predictions that ﬁt
the empirical datameasured on the real system (Webb 2001). A
model that is fully understood can then gradually be complexi-
ﬁed to incorporate more aspects of the real system to ﬁne-tune
correspondence with real-world observations, and deepen the
understanding of the system.
The collection of articles in this issue exhibits such a trend
towardmore complex and realisticmodelswhose resultsmatch
empirical observations more closely. The articles by Pestelacci
et al. and Gong et al. point out that adding a spatial component
to their models results in clustering effects often observed in
communities of living organisms. Kandler and Steele ﬁnd that
adding more realistic assumptions to their ecological model,
such as spatial heterogeneity, inﬂuences their results to provide
a better model of empirical data. Similarly, Caporael presents
a model of evolutionary change that can explain human so-
cial systems better than the traditional “ﬂat” view. Finally, in
the model presented by Hauert et al., the use of ﬁnite pop-
ulations, punishment, and a choice in participating in public
goods games—again a step toward real-life scenarios—results
in higher and more stable levels of cooperation. The increas-
ing realism of the models presented thus serves to capture the
deﬁning properties of their real counterparts, hence guiding
future empirical studies.
This thematic issue on social behavior assembles a diverse
collection of articles addressing different aspects of social be-
havior. The many parallels observed in the articles, between
sociality in humans and other living organisms, between ge-
netic and cultural evolution, and between the results obtained
in the theoretical studies presented here and empirical data,
indicate that we are well on our way to an integrated approach
to the study and understanding of social behavior. We expect
that such convergence, achieved through interdisciplinary re-
search and collaboration, will lead to a coherent view of the
general mechanisms governing social behavior.
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